Entreprise française de cybersécurité depuis 2004
☎ 03 60 47 09 81 - info@securiteinfo.com
☎ 03 60 47 09 81 - info@securiteinfo.com
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:arm64/ptrace: Fix stack-out-of-bounds read in regs_get_kernel_stack_nth()KASAN reports a stack-out-of-bounds read in regs_get_kernel_stack_nth().Call Trace:[ 97.283505] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in regs_get_kernel_stack_nth+0xa8/0xc8[ 97.284677] Read of size 8 at addr ffff800089277c10 by task 1.sh/2550[ 97.285732][ 97.286067] CPU: 7 PID: 2550 Comm: 1.sh Not tainted 6.6.0+ #11[ 97.287032] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)[ 97.287815] Call trace:[ 97.288279] dump_backtrace+0xa0/0x128[ 97.288946] show_stack+0x20/0x38[ 97.289551] dump_stack_lvl+0x78/0xc8[ 97.290203] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x84/0x3c8[ 97.291159] print_report+0xb0/0x280[ 97.291792] kasan_report+0x84/0xd0[ 97.292421] __asan_load8+0x9c/0xc0[ 97.293042] regs_get_kernel_stack_nth+0xa8/0xc8[ 97.293835] process_fetch_insn+0x770/0xa30[ 97.294562] kprobe_trace_func+0x254/0x3b0[ 97.295271] kprobe_dispatcher+0x98/0xe0[ 97.295955] kprobe_breakpoint_handler+0x1b0/0x210[ 97.296774] call_break_hook+0xc4/0x100[ 97.297451] brk_handler+0x24/0x78[ 97.298073] do_debug_exception+0xac/0x178[ 97.298785] el1_dbg+0x70/0x90[ 97.299344] el1h_64_sync_handler+0xcc/0xe8[ 97.300066] el1h_64_sync+0x78/0x80[ 97.300699] kernel_clone+0x0/0x500[ 97.301331] __arm64_sys_clone+0x70/0x90[ 97.302084] invoke_syscall+0x68/0x198[ 97.302746] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x11c/0x150[ 97.303569] do_el0_svc+0x38/0x50[ 97.304164] el0_svc+0x44/0x1d8[ 97.304749] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x100/0x130[ 97.305500] el0t_64_sync+0x188/0x190[ 97.306151][ 97.306475] The buggy address belongs to stack of task 1.sh/2550[ 97.307461] and is located at offset 0 in frame:[ 97.308257] __se_sys_clone+0x0/0x138[ 97.308910][ 97.309241] This frame has 1 object:[ 97.309873] [48, 184) 'args'[ 97.309876][ 97.310749] The buggy address belongs to the virtual mapping at[ 97.310749] [ffff800089270000, ffff800089279000) created by:[ 97.310749] dup_task_struct+0xc0/0x2e8[ 97.313347][ 97.313674] The buggy address belongs to the physical page:[ 97.314604] page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x14f69a[ 97.315885] flags: 0x15ffffe00000000(node=1|zone=2|lastcpupid=0xfffff)[ 97.316957] raw: 015ffffe00000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000[ 97.318207] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000[ 97.319445] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected[ 97.320371][ 97.320694] Memory state around the buggy address:[ 97.321511] ffff800089277b00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00[ 97.322681] ffff800089277b80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00[ 97.323846] >ffff800089277c00: 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00[ 97.325023] ^[ 97.325683] ffff800089277c80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3[ 97.326856] ffff800089277d00: f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00This issue seems to be related to the behavior of some gcc compilers andwas also fixed on the s390 architecture before: commit d93a855c31b7 ("s390/ptrace: Avoid KASAN false positives in regs_get_kernel_stack_nth()")As described in that commit, regs_get_kernel_stack_nth() has confirmed that`addr` is on the stack, so reading the value at `*addr` should be allowed.Use READ_ONCE_NOCHECK() helper to silence the KASAN check for this case.[will: Use '*addr' as the argument to READ_ONCE_NOCHECK()]
No PoCs from references.
- https://github.com/w4zu/Debian_security