Entreprise française de cybersécurité depuis 2004
☎ 03 60 47 09 81 - info@securiteinfo.com
☎ 03 60 47 09 81 - info@securiteinfo.com
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:tracing: Have process_string() also allow arraysIn order to catch a common bug where a TRACE_EVENT() TP_fast_assign()assigns an address of an allocated string to the ring buffer and thenreferences it in TP_printk(), which can be executed hours later when thestring is free, the function test_event_printk() runs on all events asthey are registered to make sure there's no unwanted dereferencing.It calls process_string() to handle cases in TP_printk() format that has"%s". It returns whether or not the string is safe. But it can have somefalse positives.For instance, xe_bo_move() has: TP_printk("move_lacks_source:%s, migrate object %p [size %zu] from %s to %s device_id:%s", __entry->move_lacks_source ? "yes" : "no", __entry->bo, __entry->size, xe_mem_type_to_name[__entry->old_placement], xe_mem_type_to_name[__entry->new_placement], __get_str(device_id))Where the "%s" references into xe_mem_type_to_name[]. This is an array ofpointers that should be safe for the event to access. Instead of flaggingthis as a bad reference, if a reference points to an array, where therecord field is the index, consider it safe.
No PoCs from references.
- https://github.com/fkie-cad/nvd-json-data-feeds
- https://github.com/w4zu/Debian_security