In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:KVM: x86: Play nice with protected guests in complete_hypercall_exit()Use is_64_bit_hypercall() instead of is_64_bit_mode() to detect a 64-bithypercall when completing said hypercall. For guests with protected state,e.g. SEV-ES and SEV-SNP, KVM must assume the hypercall was made in 64-bitmode as the vCPU state needed to detect 64-bit mode is unavailable.Hacking the sev_smoke_test selftest to generate a KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGEhypercall via VMGEXIT trips the WARN: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 273 PID: 326626 at arch/x86/kvm/x86.h:180 complete_hypercall_exit+0x44/0xe0 [kvm] Modules linked in: kvm_amd kvm ... [last unloaded: kvm] CPU: 273 UID: 0 PID: 326626 Comm: sev_smoke_test Not tainted 6.12.0-smp--392e932fa0f3-feat #470 Hardware name: Google Astoria/astoria, BIOS 0.20240617.0-0 06/17/2024 RIP: 0010:complete_hypercall_exit+0x44/0xe0 [kvm] Call Trace:
No PoCs from references.
- https://github.com/oogasawa/Utility-security
- https://github.com/w4zu/Debian_security