An attacker may cause an HTTP/2 endpoint to read arbitrary amounts of header data by sending an excessive number of CONTINUATION frames. Maintaining HPACK state requires parsing and processing all HEADERS and CONTINUATION frames on a connection. When a request's headers exceed MaxHeaderBytes, no memory is allocated to store the excess headers, but they are still parsed. This permits an attacker to cause an HTTP/2 endpoint to read arbitrary amounts of header data, all associated with a request which is going to be rejected. These headers can include Huffman-encoded data which is significantly more expensive for the receiver to decode than for an attacker to send. The fix sets a limit on the amount of excess header frames we will process before closing a connection.
No PoCs from references.
- https://github.com/0xCuteSocks/cve-2023-45288
- https://github.com/11notes/docker-github-runner
- https://github.com/11notes/docker-paperless-ngx
- https://github.com/8-cm/kube-dump
- https://github.com/ARPSyndicate/cve-scores
- https://github.com/Ampferl/poc_http2-continuation-flood
- https://github.com/CodingSimia/jenkins-shiftleft
- https://github.com/DrewskyDev/H2Flood
- https://github.com/TAMULib/metadb-docker
- https://github.com/Vos68/HTTP2-Continuation-Flood-PoC
- https://github.com/aerospike-managed-cloud-services/flb-output-gcs
- https://github.com/blackmagic2023/http-2-DOS-PoC
- https://github.com/damyandd/arch-lts-setup
- https://github.com/drewtwitchell/scancompare
- https://github.com/ecomtech-oss/pisc
- https://github.com/h4ckm1n-dev/report-test
- https://github.com/hex0punk/cont-flood-poc
- https://github.com/kaisensan/desafio-girus-pick
- https://github.com/mkloubert/go-package-manager
- https://github.com/nics-tw/sbom2vans
- https://github.com/nomi-sec/PoC-in-GitHub
- https://github.com/runwhen-contrib/helm-charts
- https://github.com/testing-felickz/docker-scout-demo