Entreprise française de cybersécurité depuis 2004
☎ 03 60 47 09 81 - info@securiteinfo.com
☎ 03 60 47 09 81 - info@securiteinfo.com
The code that processes control channel messages sent to `named` calls certain functions recursively during packet parsing. Recursion depth is only limited by the maximum accepted packet size; depending on the environment, this may cause the packet-parsing code to run out of available stack memory, causing `named` to terminate unexpectedly. Since each incoming control channel message is fully parsed before its contents are authenticated, exploiting this flaw does not require the attacker to hold a valid RNDC key; only network access to the control channel's configured TCP port is necessary.This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.2.0 through 9.16.43, 9.18.0 through 9.18.18, 9.19.0 through 9.19.16, 9.9.3-S1 through 9.16.43-S1, and 9.18.0-S1 through 9.18.18-S1.
No PoCs from references.
- https://github.com/Maribel0370/Nebula-io
- https://github.com/iwamatsu/debian-lts-changelog-tool
- https://github.com/krlabs/dnsbind-vulnerabilities
- https://github.com/lekctut/sdb-hw-13-01
- https://github.com/pedr0alencar/vlab-metasploitable2
- https://github.com/runwhen-contrib/helm-charts